Beyond the Bargain: Can an Approver Ever Truly Be Pardoned for Crimes Against Humanity?

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RaisuL Sourav is a Doctoral Researcher at the School of Law, University of Galway, Ireland and an Associate Professor (on leave) at the Department of Law, Dhaka International University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT)-1[1] of Bangladesh has delivered the first verdict for crimes against humanity committed over a deadly crackdown during the student and public-led July uprising 2024 on 17 November 2025, sentencing ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan to death in absentia.[2] Although former Inspector General of Police (IGP) of Bangladesh Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun was sentenced to five years in prison[3] despite being convicted of the same crime committed under sections 3(2)(a)(g)(h), 4(1), 4(2)(a) and 4(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act (ICTA), 1973 as he was regarded as an approver[4] under the ICTA of Bangladesh in the same case.

Hence, this blog article investigates both the domestic and international law regarding the issue of approver for international crimes and assesses whether lenient punishment can be awarded in this case. Moreover, it sheds light on the question that whether there is any exception when the tribunal can inflict punishment on the approver who tendered pardon for disclosing full truth? The article concludes that the existing provision of approver under the ICTA is neither compliant with international standards nor with domestic practice.

The Provisions Relating to Approver under Bangladeshi Laws

Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun’s lenient sentence has raised a question relating to the compliance of the ICTA with the established standard of international criminal law. Section 15 of the ICTA deals with the provision of ‘approver’ although the Act does not provide any definition to it. Generally, when a pardon is tendered under domestic criminal law, the prospective approver must be explicitly and unambiguously informed of its precise scope. They must be advised that the impunity from prosecution applies strictly to the specified case or cases under certain conditions, and to no others. Former police chief of Bangladesh Mr.  Chowdhury was the only one arrested among the accused in this case and first person declared as approver under the Act in the history of the tribunal, and that is why his lenient penalty creates debate regarding its suitability.

How Mr Chowdhury Became an Approver

As per media reports, during the charge hearing, the former IGP pleaded guilty and sought mercy to the tribunal. That day he told the tribunal that ‘I want to become a state approver and disclose the full details of the crimes committed during the July–August movement. I wish to assist the court in uncovering the truth.’ Consequently, the tribunal granted his plea and treated him as an approver for the case.[5] Since then, he has been turned into a prosecution witness and gave crucial evidence. Subsequently, in his testimony, he stated that the then prime minister Sheikh Hasina directly ordered the use of lethal weapons to suppress the anti-discrimination student movement.

The Reasons of Lenient Punishment of Former Police Chief in Bangladesh

The vital legal question arises after this judgment that whether a prosecution witness in an international crimes case, who was an accused in that case earlier, should be awarded an appropriate sentence or be acquitted or awarded lenient punishment if the conditions are fulfilled under the law.

The Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal said  that it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, while the tribunal can pardon him if a full and true disclosure of the crime is revealed through his testimony or make any other order. The conditions for such pardon outlined in the ICTA are i) full (not partial), ii) true (not fabricated) disclosure about the iii) whole (not in part) of the circumstances by the approver.

In this case, the ICT stated that, in delivering the verdict against the former police chief, consideration was given to his role as an ‘approver’ or state witness in proving the charges of the case. He admitted to being involved in all incidents of the 36-day uprising, and his contribution, along with tangible evidence, was taken into account when deciding his sentence. According to the tribunal’s order, Mr Chowdhury made a ‘full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances’ within his knowledge, including details of his own involvement and that of other accused individuals.[6] While the maximum punishment could have been imposed due to his involvement in the crimes, the court inflicted extenuating sentenced him to five years.[7]

Exception: When an Approver May Award Punishment Instead of Pardon

If the approver does not fulfil the conditions set forth for the pardon, then the initially tendered pardon will be revoked. In that case, the approver can be tried for the original offense for which s/he was pardoned, and his/her own confession/statement given as part of the pardon process can be used against him/her in that trial. Moreover, punishment can also be given if the approver is found to have committed a different crime that is not covered by the pardon. Thus, the pardon offered under S. 15 of the ICTA does not provide blanket immunity for all criminal activities of the approver. Nevertheless, in this case, it is clear from the remarks made by the tribunal that no such condition was violated by Mr Chowdhury.[8] As a result, the exception is not applicable for him.

Nevertheless, there is no explanation about the word pardon neither in the ICTA nor in the judgment. Does it mean acquittal or a lesser punishment than what should have been given? As a result, an interpretation from the court would have been helpful to avoid the confusion.

International Laws Regarding Guilty Plea for International Crimes

Article 65 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a framework for proceedings on an admission of guilt where the tribunal is not bound by the admission and must satisfy itself that: i) the accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission, ii) the admission is made voluntarily after sufficient consultation with defence counsel and such admission is supported by the facts of the case, based on the charges, any evidence presented by the prosecutor, and any other materials presented by the accused. 

Nevertheless, it is clear in the Rome Statute that the accused remains accused not turn into a prosecution witness, and the Chamber may convict the accused even if the accused satisfies the above requirements. Hence, there is no scope for a predetermined or lenient sentence for an admission under Article 78.

In addition, the Guidelines for Agreements Regarding Admission of Guilt adopted by the ICC in 2020 heavily emphasize the Court’s independent duty to establish the truth. Judges must examine not just the agreement between the parties, but also other evidence presented by the prosecutor and any other evidence, which can include victim representations and other sources, to ensure the facts are complete. The Guidelines also explicitly recognize the need for victims to be informed of the proceedings and to be able to present their views and concerns, ensuring the process does not overlook their interests. Yet, the ICTA of Bangladesh does not have any provisions related to this!

In contrast, the statutes and rules of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) contained provisions for formal plea agreements under Rules 62 ter of the ICTY and 62 bis of the ICTR. An accused could plead guilty to specific charges, often after negotiations with the prosecutor, who might agree to drop other counts or recommend a sentence. However, the Trial Chamber was not bound by the agreement. Judges had to verify that the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal and that a sufficient factual basis for the crimes existed. In these cases, a convicted person received a sentence determined by the judges, with a guilty plea being a significant mitigating factor, often leading to a substantially reduced term.

The primary goals of international criminal law and tribunals are not just to punish, but to establish a historical record of atrocities, promote reconciliation, and deter future crimes; whereas a unilateral pardon could undermine these goals by appearing to offer impunity. Sentences are meant to reflect the individual’s guilt and the gravity of the crime, while a pardon can circumvent this carefully calibrated judicial process. Additionally, the permissibility of pardons and amnesties in the context of international crimes is highly contentious. This contention stems from the jus cogens character of Crimes Against Humanity, a status recognized by the International Law Commission. Consequently, granting a pardon here may not merely be a domestic policy choice, but a serious breach of an overriding international legal obligation.

Conclusion

Mr. Chowdhury, who was the police chief, is criminally liable for crimes against humanity, and a complete pardon or acquittal is incompatible with the core principle of individual criminal responsibility for international atrocities, which seeks to eliminate impunity.

Nevertheless, it is also not clear that was he punished without getting the opportunity for a fair trial? How can a prosecution witness be punished without violating the conditions? Moreover, he did not present a traditional defense to contest the charges against him. Instead, his participation in this trial focused on providing evidence as prosecution witness against the principal accused i.e., Sheikh Hasina and Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal.

But it is clear that despite repeated amendments, there are still many ambiguities and loopholes in the ICTA of Bangladesh and the law has not yet reached international standards. Due to these legal vagueness and weaknesses, there is now an opportunity to question the trial process and punishment of Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun. Especially in the provisions related to approvers, neither the prevailing law in the country nor international standards were followed. As a result, this punishment could not overcome the threshold of fairness in any aspect. As a result, justice may now be obstructed, and this has created an opportunity to question the fairness of the overall trial process.


[1] There are two tribunals (ICT-1 and ICT-2) constituted under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 in Bangladesh to expedite the trial.

[2] The Chief Prosecutor vs. Sheikh Hasina, Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal and Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun, ICT-BD Case No. 02 of 2025, <https://ictcp.gov.bd/pages/notices/%E0%A6%B6%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%96-%E0%A6%B9%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%BE%E0%A7%9F%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%AA%E0%A6%BF-6965e005af6c385f9948e166> accessed 19 January 2026.

[3] Under section 20 of the Internal Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

[4] Approver is a common phenomenon in domestic criminal law in many jurisdictions including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan etc., where the national criminal law allows an individual who is believed to be implicated in a crime, whether directly or as an accomplice, who is subsequently granted a pardon in exchange for his/her testimony usually as a prosecution witness with an aim to acquiring deposition against other accused’s guilty of the offence. Usually, domestic law permits this process to ensure trial of principal accused through the evidence of his/her accomplice. So that the trial is not hindered due to lack of evidence in complex and crucial cases.

[5] The Chief Prosecutor vs. Sheikh Hasina, Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal and Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun, ICT-BD Case No. 02 of 2025, page 17-18.

[6] Ibid, page 451

[7] Ibid, page 455

[8] ibid

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